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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT -1\ND APPELLANT IN
SUPPORT OF l')ETITION FOR REHEARING

I.
This Court failed to recognize the distinction in the
laze of nuisances betzceen perrnanent and temp~orary damages, and adopted the wrong rneasure of damag,es.
In its opinion in the principal case this Court said that
~ • the trial court properly held that the nuisance was a
recurring rather than a continuing one." Furthermore,
-'it appears that the trial court based depreciation on
the frequent recurrence of stench, not on any assumption that the building and other physical structures of
appellant as located constituted a nuisance."
Also: ''There can be no doubt about the fact that
the operation of defendant's plant, by reason of the
nauseating odors and stenches thereby produced, constituted an intermittent but frequently recurring nuisance \vi thin the 1neaning of our statutes.''
And: ''Furthermore, the trial court properly held
that the nuisance was a recurring rather than a continuing one, and therefore very properly held that the
statutes of limitations were inapplicable."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Clearly this Court adopted the vie\v that the nuisance
"\Yas recurrent. 1'"et it adopted the 1neasure of damages
used by the lower court-the depreciation of market
value of plaintiffs' property, which is aln1ost universally
recognized as an unfair measure except for a permanent
nuisance, and \vhich has not been adopted by this Court
until this case even for permanent nuisances, except by
consent of the litigants. The opinion cites 1"'hackery v.
Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813, and
Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558,
L. R. A. 1916 C. 1260, as the authorities for the use of
depreciation of 1narket value for a recurrent nuisance
and for pern1anent uninterrupted nuisances. Neither
case, however, so holdB. The Lewis case holds that the
proper measure is the depreciation in the value of the
use of the premises ; the Thackery case, that the parties
Inay acquiesce in the use of the n1arket value as a
measure.

Lewis ;z:. Pingree N atl. Bank, supra, involved a permanent damage caused by the encroach1nent of pillars of
a bank on the property of the plaintiff and hy the projection of the pillars and steps of the bank into the sidevvalk in such a manner a~ to injure the business of the
plaintiff's je\velry store.
The court said:
"When, as here, ho\vever, the court does not
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deem it just and equitable to order the thing
\\~hich causes the impairment of the value as
aforesaid to be removed, then the plaintiff must
in one action recover his dan1ages for all time,
and the defendant, unless he chooses to re1nove
the offending structure, n1ust pay all the damages
suffered by the plaintiff both past and prospectiYe. lT nder such circ1nnstances the measure of
da1nages, as stated by ~Jr. Sutherland, is, 'How
n1uch the value of the plaintiff's use of the premises affected has been lessened by the defendant's
\\~rongdoing ~ J? ,,~ e thus see that in cases like the
one at bar plaintiff's property is not directly
affected or depreciated by physical injury, but
the Yalue of its use for business purposes only is
affected~ and n1ay to some extent be depreciated.
If it were thus sho,vn that the obstruction lessened
or reduced the rental value of plaintiff's storerooin, it \vould depreciate the value of the use of
such roo1n. The plaintiff is entitled, therefore,
to recover in one action the full depreciation of
the value of his property as just stated. To illustrate: Assuming that the pillars complained of
reduced or lessened the rent of plaintiff's store
to the extent of $33.33 per month, then his property would be damaged in a su1n which, if invested
at the legal rate of interest, \vould produce that
amount. 'Vhat is that sum~ Under our legal
rate of interest, it would be $5,000, since $5,000,
invested at 8 per cent. interest, would yield $400
a year, or an equivalent of $33.33 per month. If
the rent of plaintiff's store, therefore, is reduced
to the amount of $33.33 per month, he should be
awarded $5,000, and no more. The foregoing
illustration is offered 1nerely as a guide in deterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mining the measure of damages, where, as here,
the whole damages must be recovered in one action, and in doing so we do not intimate that the
plai.ntiff suffered that or any other sum or amount
of damages. The foregoing n1easure of damages
is also approved in Joyce, I.Jaw of Nuisances, section 259, and in 3 Joyce on Dan1ages, section
2150. ''
In the Thackery case the parties had stipulated and
agreed upon the n1easure of damages. The court said:
''The only error argued by appellant is the
ruling of the court in holding that the cause of
action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
At the oral argument counsel for the appellant
stated that, if this court is of the opinion that
the action is not barred by the statute of lin1itations, he did not ask a reversal of the judg1nent. ''
Directly on the point of damages the court further
said:
"It is suggested in the argun1ent that, the
injury being a recurring invasion of respondent's
rights, the court could not per1nit recovery of full
co1npensation in one action as for a pern1anent
injury. In other words, that the respondent's
causes of action \Vere founded upon a recurring
nuisance, and that, the nuisance being in its nature
abatable either by act of the parties or by judicial
decree, the only power the court had was to per1ni t
recovery of such damages as had been sustained
within the period of liinitation prior to the in~titn-
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tion or trial of the action. The court in this case
is dealing \vith private parties. The appellant is
neither a public nor a quasi public corporation.
Ho\vever necessary or beneficial the products
manufactured by appellant may be for the comInunity in constructing public roads and in general
building operations, nevertheless it is distinctly a
private enterprise. No g~ood reason appea.rs,
therefore, zDhy, if the parties so elect ~either by
agreenzent or by acqniescence, the c-ourt should not
pernzit a recocery ·of co1npBnsation as for a perJnanent injury in one acti~on. Such would necessarily tend to lessen litigation and once and for
all detern1ine the respective rights of the parties.
~r any of the states, as I understand the decisions,
pern1it that to be done. That right was recognized
by this court in Kinsman v. Gas Co., 53 Utah, 10,
177 P. 418." (Italics .ours.)
In the case at bar there has been no acquiescence
and no agreement that this measure could be used in this
c-ase. Objections vvere raised at all proceedings to the
irrelevance, incompetency, and immateriality of questions based on this n1easure. (Trans. 1127, Abs. 288 ;
Trans. 1129, _._~bs. 290; Trans. 1209, Abs. 308; Trans.
1214, Abs. 310 ~ Trans. 1234, Abs. 321; Trans. 1235, Abs.
322 ; Trans. 1250, Abs. :325; Trans. 1251, Abs. 326.) The
evidence, of course, is uncontradicted to the effect that the
odors are recurring and intermittent and do no damage
\vhatever to the crops or the productivity of the land.
Under the decision as it is now phrased, the plaintiffs \Vill have recovered the full difference bet\veen the
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value of the land as it would be without the presence of
the plant and as it i~ with the plant in operation. The
evidence shows that there are many other neighbors in
the community and living at distances less than those
of some of the plaintiffs who have not participated in
this law suit (Abs. 192, Tr. 830). Any one of these
neighbors, or anyone succeeding to the interest of any
of these neighbors who have not participated, can no'v
come in and possibly under a different sho\ving of facts
obtain an injunction. 'rhe plant in that event will be
forced to close do,vn. These plaintiffs' properties 'vill
then be restored to their original value, but the plaintiffs
will have nevertheless received these damages con1puted
upon the permanent existence and operation of the plant.
Obviously, this is inequitable ~nd alone should be grounds
for granting a rehearing for further investigation h~·
this Court into the lavv regarding permanent and temporary n u1sances.
In 39 American Juris prudence 131, 132 and 1;13
(pages 391-397), it is said:

DistinctiDn between Permanent onrl
Recurrent Injuries :
In order to give a
cause of action for original and per1nanent dan1ages, the injury n1ust be constant and continuous,
not occasional, intermittent, or recurrent.'' . . .
"§ 131.

"§ 132. Abatable Character of Nuisance as·
T.est: To make the cause of the injury permanent
in the legal sense of the tern1, there must he, in
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force or op~ration, a lPgal right to 1naintain it .
. . \rrnrrling to 1nnny of th(? authorities a nuisance
is te1nporary or continuing \vhere it is re1nediable,
renloYable~ or abatable, as \vhere it may be abaterl
hy the defendant, or b~· legal process at the in~tance of the injured party, against the \vill of
the person creating it. For this reason it has
been said that the elen1ent of per1nanency of a
cause of injury is generally lacking in cases of
public and private nuisances, and that aln1ost
every pure nuisance is regarded in la\v as being
continuous. So, it has been held that except in the
rase of public or quasi-public corporation, a nuisance resulting from a business conducted or a
structure or 'vorks erected and n1aintained by a
person on his o\vn property is a continuing one,
as, for exa1nple, a nuisance consisting of smoke,
ft1111es. or odors .... "
'• § 135. Depreciation ~in T?a.hte of Property:
. If the nuisance is of an occasional or temporary character, the 1neasure of damage is the
difference in the rental or usable value of the
pre1niscs before and after the injury, or, it has
been held, \vhere the property is rented, the difference in its rental value during the term of the
lease. ~rhe diminution in the value of the fee in
the land is not a proper test in such case.''

In Robb 1i. Carne.qie Bros. & C,o., 145 (Pa.) 324, 22
.A tl. (j.-t~), plaintiff brought an action to recover damages
for injuries to his far1n by reason of the smoke and gas
fr(nn defendant's eoke ovens erected on adjoining lands.
rfhP }u\\'C~r COUrt granted cla1nages by perinitting testiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1nony regarding the productivity of the farm if the s1noke
\\rere absent. The Supreme Court asked, "What then is
the measure of damages~' ' and answered the question
hy saying:
''If the result is to sho\v a per1nanent injury
to the soil which impairs its productiveness to an
appreciable degree, the extent of the loss in the
value of the farm can be readily computed. If
such permanent impairment is not made to appear, this part of plaintiff's claim should be rejected altogether. The fact that the plaintiff n1ay
regard his home as less desirable than before
because of the proximity of an undesirable business or of undesirable neighbors, or the further
fact that its selling value has been reduced by
reason of such proximity, affords no ground for a
recovery. The location of a livery stable, a restaurant, a distillery, and n1any other kinds of
business close to one's ho1ne nlight din1inish its
co1nfort and its rnarket value, but the owner \Vonld
he without legal redress, so far as the effpet of
1nere proxinTity is concerned.
''If, ho\vever, the business \vas so conducted
as to affect the use of adjoining property or the
health of its occupant~.;, these tangihle and substantial injuries capable of measuren1ent by a
pecuniary standard n1ight sustain an action for
da1nages. The ordinary rtttle for the ascertainn1ent
of damages, where land has been entered and
appropriated under the right of e1ninent donuti·n,
does not furnish a rneasure ·Of the plaintiff's r1"ght
t·o recover in this case, for the reason already
given. Where an entr~T and seizure has been 1naclc\
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the effect of the sPizurr and appropl'iation of part
of the land. of the O\Yner to a partieular use is to
be consi(lered, as \veil as the value of vvhat is
tnken. This can be best ailjusted b~~ ascertaining
the selling Yalue of the \vhole property before the
entry, and after it has been made. The difference~
if any~ sho\\~s the actual loss which the ovvner has
suffered. But in this rase there has been no entry
upon or appropriation of the plaintiff's land.
\\"'"hat he alleges is that the prosecution of the busine~s of n1aking coke l1y the defendants on their
o\vn land has hurt his erops and injured his soil.
They have the right to n1ake coke. If the establi~hn1ent of that business near the plaintiff affects
the selling value of his farm, he can no more recov-er for that than he could recover against the
saloon-keeper or the livery-man because the location of their business near him had n1ade his property un~alable. The nature of the husiness is
therefore to he left out of vie\v. The sole question
is, "That ha1·1n had been done h~T the plaintiff by,
or as the direct result of, the prosecution of the
defendant's business at a place where they had a
legal right to carry it on~ The plaintiff might
honestly think, and his neighbors might be willing
to testify, that the mere location of the ovens on
adjoining land reduced the value of his farm 30
or 50 per cent, or more, and a comparison by them
of the value before and after the building of these
ovens vvould include this element, for vvhich there
ran he no recovery.'' (Itali'cs ours.)

The difference het,veen temporary, recurrent damag-r, like that raused by the fluctuating odors of the Colorado Anilnal plant, and perrnanent physical dan1ages to
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realty, is shown the case of IJfid-C.antinent Petroleurn
Corp vs. Fisher, 183 Okla. 638, 84 Pac. (2d) 22. That
case involved permanent damage. The defendant drilled
several oil wells and the salt \Vater and oil from these
\vells polluted a creeh:, and overflo\ving the plaintiff's
lands, destroyed the fertility of his soil and killed a
number of pecan trees. The defendant contended that
the proper measure of damage was the loss of use or
rental value sustained by the plaintiff to the date of
filing because the nuisance \Vas abatable, and because a
ten1porary injurious condition vvill not suppo1·t a judgment for permanent damage to realty.
The court held that this damage \Vas pern1anent and
said:
''The rule of damages stated by the defendant
is a correct rule vvhen applied to the proper factual situation and has been follovved by thi~ court
\vhen the damage suffered was teinporary and ~us
ceptible of being remedied by the expenditure of
1noney or labor. City of Cushing v. High, 73 Old.
151, 175 P. 229; City of Ardmore v. Orr, 35 OkL
305, 129 P. 867. But in the instant case the plaintiff sought to recover con1pensation fo1· perinanent damage to his realty. Either the dainage or
the cause of the da1nage can be pern1anent, in the
legal sense, or temporary, but the rule of dan1ages applicable in a given case is deterinined by
\vhether the damage suffered is pern1anent or
temporar~r rather than vvhether the caus0 of the
damage is permanent or temporary and su.~cept
ible of being remedied and abaterl. ''
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~S-L

llacine r. C'atllolic Ei.~.,·hop of C'hicn/}o, 290 Ill. App.
S X l~. (:?d) 210, involYed foul odor~ fro1n se"\\rage.

The court

~aid:

""It has been ~aid, as to nuisances "\vhich may
be ren1oved at any tiine or abated at the instance
of a party aggrievPd thereb~r, that the depreciation in the n1arket of selling value of the premises
affected "Ta~ not the n1easure of damages, and
eYidence of such depreciation not proper. Fairbauk Co. c. ~-ricolai, 167 Ill. 242, 246, 47 N. E.
3GO. If the property alleged to be damaged is
rental propert~T' then in ease of injury from such
nuisance, the damages "\vould be measured by the
lo~~ in rental value; and if the plaintiff occupies
the pre1nise~ himself, the damages would be measured by his diseo1nfort and the deprivation of
the use and co1nforts of his ho1ne. In the case
no"T before us, the plaintiff neither lived upon
the premises nor used the same for rental purposes. He alleged that a total loss had been sustained hy him 'vith respect to the market value of
the unsold lots in said subdivision. It has been
said that the pollution of a stream by se,vage is
a continuing nuisance, and that, ''vhen a nuisance
is regarded as a continuing, rather than a perITlanent, one, judgments of law are held to afford
con1pensation only for the injury sustained to
the time of such judginent, and a continuance of
the nuisance is a grievance for ,~vhich subsequent
actions m.ay· be maintained.' ...
''After an examination of the record, we fail
to find "\Vhere appellant's evidence tended to sho'v
any item of damage 'vhich coul(1 be considered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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proper under the rules applicable to this action.
The ·record fails to disclose any evidence tending
to show what damages appellant claims to have
sustained or the extent thereof, except his clain1
that the appellee, by admitting sewage to the
creek, has destroyed the entire market value of
the unsold lots in said subdivision, to the da1nage
of appellant of $105,000. Such vvas not a proper
elen1ent of damages in this case .... ''
In C~ity ,of Nashville v. Comer, 88 Tenn. 418, 12 S.\\'".
1027, an action \vas brought to recover dan1ages resulting
in the discharge, in times of unusual freshet, of se\vage
"rater on the pren1ises o\vned by the plaintiffs. The trial
judge charged the jury that if they found fro1n the
evidence'' that the 1narket value of the plaintiffs' property
has been permanently impaired by the construction of the
se,ver, its proxin1i(v and liability to back up surfae(•
\Vater, and discharge offensive sewage n1atter upon his
pren1ises, he \vould be entitled to recover the differener
in the market value of the propert~T before and since
the building of the sewer.'' The Supren1e Court held this
instruction to be error, saying:
''The moment an action has been con1menre(l,
shall the defendant, in such a case, be precluded
from remedying its wrong~ Shall it be so precluded after a recovery against it~ Does it establish the right to continue to be a wrong-doer
. forever by the payment of a recovery against it u?
Shall it have no benefit by discontinuing the
wrong~
And shall it not be left the option to
discontinue it~ 101 N.Y. 125, 4 N.E. T~ep. 552.
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ns~tunption
~llllled fron1 thP

rr'his

that H \\'TOng-doer is to be pre1nere eharurter of the \Vork to
intend to continue in his 'vrong, and that he will
not ren1edy his defective or unskilled \Vork, is
repudiated in the 1najority of An1erican cases ....
'Che 'veight of authority and the weight of
rea~on alike conden1n, as contrary to a true public policy, any rule by 'vhich a wrong-doer may
thu~ procure a license to continue his n1isconduct.
~uch a rule "'"ould in many instances operate as a
1nethod by \vhich private property 'vould be condenlned to private use against the will of the
O\vner. It see1ns to us that the true rule deducible fro1n the authorities is that the la'v will not
presu1ne the continuance of a wrong, nor allo\v
a license to continue a 'vrong, where the causing
the injury is of such a nature as to he abatable
either by the expenditure of labor or n1oney; and
that. 'vhere the cause of the injury is one not
presumed to continue, the dam.ages recoverable
frorn the \Vrong-doer are only such as have accrued before action brought, and that successive
actions 1nay be brought for the subsequent continuance of the 'vrong or nuisance.
H

"It follo\\Ts that it \Vas error to ad1nit proof
as to the effect of the overfio,ving se,ver upon the
1narket value of Con1er 's property, and error to
charge the jury that they could assess the damages upon any assumption that the 'vrong of the
eity would be perpetuated.''
The cases involving odors from raw sewage are
particularly analogous to the case at bar. Conestee 1Wills
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
Green,ville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113, 75 A.IJ.R. r)19,
\·v·as another such case. One of the defenses presented
vvas that the plaintiff had purchased his land after the
installation of the sewage system. The judgment of the
lower court dismissing the co1nplaint -vvas reversed by
the Supreme Court, \vhich said:

'V.

''And by the better rule, the determination
of the question of one right or successive rights
in turn depends chiefly upon whether the cause of
injury is per1nanent or temporary.
''The distinction is well n1ade in Ilarntan 1).
R. Co., 87 Tenn 614, 11 S.W. 703, 704: 'There is
a broad distinction between those injuries occasioned by causes permanent in their character,
and vvhich are likely to continue with no right in
plaintiff to abate them, and those vvhich arise
from nuisances which n1ay be discontinued. In
respect to the forn1er, the entire da1nages, past
and prospective, can be estin1ated, and the cause
of action cannot be split up; \vhile as to the latter
it is not to be presumed that the 'vrongs will be
continued, and it would be unjust to defendant
to allovv plaintiff to recover dan1ages estimated
upon such an assu1nption. On the other hand, it
'vould be equally wrong to pern1it defendant to
insist upon such a rule of co1npensation, and thu~'
becon1e vested 'vith a perpetual license to co1n1nit
a nuisance, to the injury of plaintiff and over hi~
protest.'
"It should be borne in mind that the cans(·
of the injury is not necessarily· per1nanent because
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the strueturP through \\·hich it opPrntes is of a
per1nanent nature. Indeerl, the physical character
of the str,1eture itself Inay have little or no bearing upon the permaneney of the cause of the injury, as to \Yhich the principal question, according
tu the solnHler vie'Y and as indicated in the case
j u~t cited, i~ \\yhether the nuisance is legally abatablt•. -\\.-ithout atte1npting an exhaustive discus~ion of the subject, it is sufficient for the purposes
of this case to ~ay that successive injuries caused
by the negligent operation of an enterprise authorized by la"' give rise to successive rights of
action, on the theory that, while the enterprise
itseli is not abatable, the negligent manner of
operating it is illegal and abatable. That the
nuisanee here complained of was abatable 'vill
hardly be denied, as the record shows that, after
the institution of this suit, the city of G-reenville
installe<l a huge sewerage system, ineluding a disposal plant for treating the sewage, thereby effecting an actual abate1nent. ''

Oklaho;;ra C if,t/ F . .:.11cAlllister, 174 Old. 208, 50 Pac.
( 2cl) 361, 'vas an action brought against Oklahoma City
for da1nages for inadequate facilities and improper treatlnent of se,vage causing the fouling of the waters c.rossing
the plaintiff's lands .
1

.J udgn1ent for the plaintiff was reversed on the
ground that personal injury and the injury to the property had not been separated and no proof adduced of
the a1nonnt of injury.
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The court said:
"Where a nuisance causes a permanent injury to property, the measure of damages is th~
depreciated value of the property; that is, the
difference between its value before and after the
injury. If, hovvever, as in the present case, the
injury is not a permanent one, but only temporary
or removable, the measure of damages is the depreciation in the rental or usable value of the
property during the time of its maintenance, lin1ited by the statute of limitation."
In Phillips Petroleurn ~-. Rttble (Okla.), 126 Pac. ( 2)
526, the plaintiff brought suit for damages for an alleged
permanent injury to his real propert~! and for dan1ages
for personal inconvenience, annoyance and disco1nfort,
caused by tl1e n1aintenance and operation of a po\ve.r
plant by the defendant.
'J~hP

court said:

''The standard suggested by the defendant as
applied to this particular case is the depreciation
in rental value of the property occasioned by the
1naintenance of the nuisance. In order to 1nake
the standard legally appropriate, the defendant
urges that \Ve should classify the injury sustaine<l
l)y the occupant of the property, through anno);ance, inconvenience and discomfort, as a property
injury rather than a personal injury, thus departing fron1 our former vie,vs as expressed in the
above cited cases.
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'• "J 1odern judicial thoughts seek to avoid fie~
tions. \r e cannot make a manila rope into a
rubber nuton1obile tire by calling it such. Neither
can w·e change an injury to the person into one
to property hy so deno1ninating it. The fact that
the property O\vner in this type of case is using
his property at or during the time he receives the
injury does not change the character or type of
injury received. A broken arm vvould not be
called an injury to personal property because it
\Vas fractured in an automobile collision when the
injured person was using his own automobile."
In [Tnited l .. erde Extension Mining Co. v. 1-lalston_,
81 ~\riz. 354, 296 Pac. 262, the Arizona court expressed the
rule as follo\\TS :
•' The O\vners being prevented by the poison.ous fun1es from either farming or leasing their
lands in 1926 and 1927, were entitled to the fair
rental or usable value thereof for these years.
17 C. J. 883 ~ Eno 1'. Christ, 25 1\!Jisc. Rep. 24, 54
X.'{.S. 400: Ewing ,et ux. v. City of Louisville,
x140 Ky. 726, 131 S.vV. 1016, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 612;
Ponca Refining Co. v. S1nith, 73 Okl. 6, 175 P. 268;
Lipsconzb 1\ Sottth Bend R. C,o., 65 S.C. 148, 43
~.E. 388; Baltintore, etc., R.R. Co. v. B,oyd, 67 Md.
32, 10 A. 315, 1 Am. St. Rep. 362 ~ Barclay t:.
Gr-ov-e, 9 Sadler, 153, 11 A. 888. In s.edgwick on
IhunagPs, ~ 184 (9th Ed.) is found this language:

.....

''Vhere an o\vner of land is wrongfully
prevented from occupying it, the measure of
his dan1ages is the value of the use of the
lanfl-that is, its rental value. So \vhere the
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plaintiff's far1ning land \\'US \vrongfully
overfio,ved by the defendant, the r.neasure of
dan1ages is the use of the land, not the value
of the crops that 1night have hcen raised. on

•t '

1 .

'' ~rhe plaintiffs and their assit,rnors vvere, un(ler the allegations of the cornplaint, just as effectively prevented by the fun1es from occupying
and enjoying their lands as though they had been
overfio,ved by \Vater or other,vise. ~rhe gas and
smoke did not evict thein, it is true, hut did deprive the1n of the beneficial use thereof and nothing further \Vas required because the n1anner in
'vhich this use was interfered ·with, \vhether by
fumes, 'vater or othervi.,""ise, \vas inn11aterial. ''

In Idaho G~old Dredging Corp /r. FJ oise Payette LuJnber Co., 52 Idaho 76G, 22 IJac. (2) 147, plaintiff recovered
damages from the defendant upon the theory that th0
measure of damages vvas the difference between the value
of the placer mining ground, o1vned and opera ted b~v the
plaintiff, after the \Vaters had become polluted 'vith
grease and oil from the defendant's operation and its
value as it \Vould have heen had such pollution not occurred. The lower court granted a new trial. In granting this 1notion the court concluded that the grease and
oil which caused the loss of gold constituted a te1npcn·ary
nuisance and that therefore damages n1easured by the
result in depreciation in value of the rnining ground
could not he recovered. The court said:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
"Th0re are a great many cases wherein the
rule is stated to the effect that, if defendant has
dan1aged plaintiff's property by n1eans of a tempol·ary nuisance, or one vvhich can be abated,
recoYery for ten1porary injury only can be had,
and the difference in the value of the property
before and after the injury is not the proper Ineasure of dan1ages. This rule is based on the theory
that abatement of the cause of injury will abate
the injury, and it should be applied only in cases
\Vherein this is true. After all, it is the character
of the injury, "\vhether temporary or permanent,
and not the character of the cause of it, which
controls.
"In Oklahoma City v. Page, 153 Old. 285,
6 P. (2d) 1033, 1034, the Supre1ne Court of Oklahoma said:
'Although in an action for a temporary
nuisance there can be no assessment of dan1ages upon the theory that the nujsance is permanent, because that would permit a recovery
for what has not been done and what it cannot be considered vvill be done, it does not
follovv that if permanent damage has actually
been sustained from a temporary nuisance
and is not conditioned upon future conduct,
recovery for it can be denied. * :r.· ~~.:
'It is true that for a permanent nuisance
the 1neasure of compensation is one sum for
all damage, and the allowance is whatever
difference in market value results from a
consideration of all of the dan1age, but it
does not follo"\v that a difference in market
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value cannot be a proper measure of recovery
for damage done by a ten1porary nuisance,
so Jar as such a difference has actually resulted, solely from what has already been
done, and is not required to be at all conditional upon a further continuance of the tortious conduct. vVhile for a te1nporary nuisance there can only be a recovery for the
wrong already comn1itted, that in no manner
denies recovery for damage that has resulted
in depreciation in value not depenclent upon
prospective cause.' ''
JlcG-ill v. l~i-ntsch Co1npressing Couzpany, (lo1oa),

118 N .,V. 786, \Vas an action to enjoin defendant fron1
n1anufacturing con1pressed gas and for darnages.
The court said :

"Even though there was a nuisance, it does
not follo\v that dan1ages \vere proven. The dwelling \vas occupied as a tenant, and depreciation
in the value of the premises because of the injury,
as it was not permanent but subject to abate1nent,
\vas not thP n1easure of damages ... (citing cases).
In such a case, in the absenee of injury to thP
property itself, the 1neasure of da1nages is the
din1inution of the rental value caused hy thP
1naintenance of the nuisance. This depreciation
must result from interfe·rence "\vith the coinfortable enjoyment of the pre1nises, and not fron1 the
1nere prejudice against the property in consequence of its proxilnity to the plant, for the latter
depreciation cannot be said to have been caused hy
the injury. 4 Sutherland on Darnages, § 1048:
R~tst v. T7 ictoria Graving Docl-c Co., 36 Ch. Div.
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113, 131; Robb r. C'arnPgie B1~os. c(; Co., 145 Pa.
:t~-t, 22 ~-\tl. ti-±9, 1-± L.R.A. 329, 27 Am. St. Rep.
694: City of San An-tonio v. Estate of Mackey, 22
'rex. c;iY .....\pp. 1-±5, 5-l S.\V. 33.'
Shively v. (~edar lfapids, I. F. & N. Ry. Q,o., (Io,va),
37 N. \\.... 133, \\~as an artion brought to recover damages
caused by a nuisance created by the construction and
operation of a stockyard and hog lot. The declaration
charged that defendant kept almost continuously a large
nun1ber of hogs in this lot, by reason whereof the said
lot beea1ne foul and loathso1ne, and was a nuisance,
en1itting foul, unsavory, and unhealthful sn1ells, so as
to render plaintiff's house aln1ost uninhabitable, and
aln1ost totally destroying its value, greatly inconveniencing plaintiff, and endangering the health of plaintiff and
his fa1nily.

The lo\ver court charged the jury as follows:

''. . . If you find for plaintiff, then you will
proceed to assess and determine from the evidence
the amount of damages he is entitled to recover
in this action; the measure of which will be the
loss or diminution of the fair rental value of the
property in question from the time you find such
nuisance 'vas established up to the commencelnent of thi~ suit, and find for the plaintiff in such
sum .... "

or

Although the plaintiff objected that the din1inution
the fair rental value w·as an in1proper measure, the
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court approved it, hPeause, like the case at bar, th0
nuisance v.ras not necessarily a perrnanent one, saying:
' ' rl"'he appellants insist that the paragraph
of the charge quoted did not properly instruct the
jury as to the 1neasure of the plaintiff's dan1ages.
'l"'he alleged nuisance is not necessarily a perInanent one, hut rnay be abated at any time by
the defendants. Plaintiff vvould not have be0.n
entitled to recover the full value of his propert~·
even though he had shovvn that it 'vas valu~~less
'vhile the nuisance existed, because it n1ight pro"'":·e
to he but temporary, hence the depreciation in
rental value under the facts in this case 'Yas the
proper n1easure of plaintiff's recover~v·. ''
Other cases out of the many which hold that the
n1easure of da1nages used by the lo,ver court and approved in this Court's opinion is in1proper, have already
been quoted in appellant's n1ain brief, and we merely
refer to then1 here :

T7 ogt v. City of Grinnel, 98 N.W. 782, (quoted in
main brief on page 105) :

Bartless v. Gresselle Che1nioal CD., 92 \\7 • , ... a. 445,
115 S.E. 451, 27 A.L.R. 54 (quoted on page
106 of the main brief) ;
Theisen v. Pitwin ~s (e Dean Co., 162 N.\\i. 7G
(quoted on page 111 of the brief) ;
.Ehlert r. Galveston H. & S. A. Railroad Conzpany_,
27 4 S.W. 172 (quoted on page III of brief) :
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Cross r. Te.ras Jfilitary Colleg-e, 65 S.W. (2d) 794
(quoted on page 114 of brief) ;
Oates v ..AJgedon lJ!fg. Co., 217 N. C. 488, 8 S. E.
(2d) 605 (quoted on page 116 of brief);
City of A-4da r. Ill elberg, 160 N.W. 257 ( quoted on
page 117 of brief) ;
City of San Antonio v. Mackey's Estate, 54 S.W.
33 (quoted on page 119 of the brief).
In contrast to this general rule of law, this Court,
unless it grants a rehearing, will go on record as approving the follo\ving doctrine expressed in its opinion in
the principal case :
''The findings and conclusions of the court
indicate that in assessing damages the trial judge
used the proper criterion-the difference in market value of each tract with its improvements
\vithout the stench nuisance existing, as compared
\vith the value as affected by such odors.''
\Ve submit that it is inequitable for this Court to
lay down at this late date a standard like the above for
ascertaining temporary damages. It opens the way for
unjust enrich1nent .of the plaintiffs. It violates principles
of fairness and ignores entirely the possibility of any
improvement or abatement made by the defendant, of
voluntary discontinuance of business, or of an injunction action successfully brought by other neighbors.
Already in the record (Trans. 891, 1035 ; Abs. 241,
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258) there is testin1ony of iruproven1ents in the fire box
and in the 1nanner of controlling the gases. \Vho can
say that further adjushnents or the addition of a ne'v
jnvention 1nay not in this year or next eli1ninate the
odors entirely~ The n1easure of damages adopted by
this. Court not only discourages the elirnination of the
nuisances by n1aking the defendant pay as for a pernlanRnt nuisance but it re,vards the plaintiffs for a perInanent injury which they have not suffered and n1ay
never suffer.

II.
This Court has ignored the doct·rine of' Da,hl v. Utab
Oil Refinin.r; Oo1npany.
On the question of the operation of plants en1ittinr~:
odors in industrial areas the princi])al case holds directly
contrary to the case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Ilefining C1ontpany, 71 Utah 1, 262 Pacific 269.
In the principal case the court said:
''The mere fact thn t an area is not incorporated in a city or town with zoning regulations,
does not 'varrant establish1nent of eommereial
institutions "\Vhich emit the described stenches in
such region where life thereby will be rendrr~d
unpleasant to the residents thereof. Nor does the
fact that an industry n1ay serve a useful purposP
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produce colninercial commodities \Varrant its
location at a place vvhich merely suits the convenience of the ovvner or operator, in \ltter disregard for the effect it has on the value· or enjoyment of other properties.
t)r

''. . . \Y-hen an industry is of such a character that it produces foul odors, those who are
responsible for its operation have the duty to
place it "There it vvill not result in injury to the
property of others. The mere fact that there
1nay already exist in the area a condition which
1nay be obnoxious to some persons, does not
create a license for establishment of· other more
offensive conditions.''
In the Dahl case the contrary la\V \Vas established;
the court sa·ying:
''The right to recover damages for injuries
occasioned by fumes, gases, dust, smoke, foul air,
etc., being cast upon one's property by another,
in proper cases, is well established. But the rule
of liability is not absolute and the law does not
afford Tedress for every such discomfort or annoyance. Extreme rights in this regard cannot be
enforced. Of necessity- some degree of inconvenience and annoyance must be endured or comlnunity and social life would be impossible. It
thus follows that what constitutes in law an actionable nuisance is al\vays a question of degree.
The cases cited and relied on by the plaintiff are
instances vvhere, under all the circumstances, the
use of the property con1plained of was held unreasonable. I-Iere, \vhere the facts and circumSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stances, hoth \vith respect to the origin antl nature
of the thing contplained of and the degree of its
offense, differ essentially fron1 those of the cases
cited, \ve have an entirely different legal question.
While a nuisance, in the orclinary sense in
\vhich the vvord is used, is anything that pro<luces
an annoyance--anything that disturbs one or is
offensive-in legal phraseology it is applied to
that class of \Vrongs that arise fron1 the unreasonable, unvvarrantahle, or unla,vfu] use by a person
of his property. f~very person has the right to
tl1e reasonable enjoy1nent of his property. As to
\vhat is a reasonable use of one's property rnust
necessarily depend upon the circun1stances of each
case, for a use for a particular purpose an(l in n
particular \vay, in one localit~~, that \vould hcJ.
la\vful and reasonable rnight he unla,vful and a
nuisance in another. 1 vVood on Nuisances (3r<1
Ed.) §§ 1, 2. The test of vvhether the use of the
property constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the use con1plained of in the particular
locality and in the 1nanner and under the circun1stances of the case. 29 Cyc. 1156. A business
\vhich might be perfectly proper in a business or
n1anufacturing neighborhood 1nay he a nuisance
"\vhen carried on in a residential distrjct; and, conversely, a business which 'vith its incidents 1night
he considered a nuisance in a residential distric-t
1nay be proof against Ct)lnplaint where conducted
in a business of n1anufacturing locality, although
an extraordinary use of property introducing a
serious annoyance which directly and suhstall-tially damages the property of another or cau~e~
unnecessary annoyance to persons in the vicinit~·
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not justified by the fact that the place is a
lllanufactnring locality. :2D C~Te. 11~7, 1158."
The follo\ving further quotation fro1n the Dahl case
applies to the rase at bar:
"There is no claim that the defendant,. by
any careless or extraordinary or unnecessary use
of its property, produces the injury complained of.
The sole ground of con1plaint is that offensive and
disagreeable fumes or odors emanate from the
refinery and are carried through the air to the
plaintiff's house. It is admitted that the odors
are not constant and are not injurious to life or
health, and it is obvious that they cause no direct
or physical injury to property. The extent of
the offense claimed is that the odors are disagreeable and unpleasant and have at times vvakened
persons sleeping in plaintiff's house and required
then1 to shut doors and windows. In these circtnnstances vve are unable to say as a matter of
ls'v that a case of unreasonable use or actionable
nuisance was made out.''
One error of this Court in the case at bar consisted
n1ainly in its failure to recognize that the defendant's
plant is established in the neighborhood and surroundings most appropriate for its establishment. If we recognize the law' to be that the whole question of nuisance is
one of reasonableness, as the Dahl case sets forth, then
're should look again at the surroundings and ask ourselves whether the plant could have been established in
any place more suitable than the one chosen. It is built
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( 1) upon a plot of ground where a brick 1nanufacturing

plant had been operated for many years; (2) it 'va~
built on the railroad and particularly on the spur of that
railroad not far from a second railroad, and (3) near a
sugar factory, pea vinery, flour mill, alfalfa mill, cattle
feed yards, stock loading yard, beet storage and loading
chutes, and vvoolloading platforms.
This Court has found on its opinion-we submit
\vrongly-that the area in '\Thich the plant is established
is not industrial, and in so doing it has failed to recognize
the essential element behind the doctrine of the Dahl case
and the. la\v of nuisance, to-wit: "that an establish1nent
is not a nuisance \Vhen it is reasonably constructed and
operated in an area to 'vhich it is adapted."
This Court points out that the sugar factory, pea
viriery, n1ills, feed yards and loading y·ards are essential
to the marketing of the agricultural products and live
stock. So we submit: given the defendant's plant, which
ren1oves the dead carcasses fro1n the neighborhood, provides an outlet for waste n1atter and furnishes feed and
fertilizer to the farmers-vvhere could a 1nore appropriate place for its operations be found than on an old
brick-yard near the railroad, in the outskirts of the coinmunity furnishing the material for its existence~ While
we believe the court erred vvhen it said that the plant
is not in an industrial area, the point we vvish to n1ake
is this: that the reasonableness of the location and opera-
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tion of this plant does not depend upon 'vhether the area
i~ industrial or not. ...~s this Court said :
''The test of 'vhether the use of the property
constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the
use con1plained of in the particular locality and
in the 1nanner and under the circumstances of the
case.·' D·ahl 'l'. Ut.ah Oil Refining Company,
supra.
This Court in its opinion in the case at bar has failed
to note that the distinction is not the simple difference
between an industrial area and a residential area. There
i~~ an infinite ntnnber of gradations between the two. To
find that the area is not industrial does not necessarily
1nean that it is residential. The opinion disregards the
cattle, sheep and hogs, the barnyards 'vith their filth,
the pea viner, the sugar factory, and the stock loading
chutes on the railroad, together with the fact that the
defendant's plant is on an old brick yard on the outskirts
of a sparsely settled community, and treats the area in
the same manner that it \-Vould treat the most rigidly
zoned, thickly populated, strictly residential area in a
city. The absence of zoning restrictions does not warrant
the establishment of such institutions, says the opinion.
Neither, \-Ve subn1it, should the presence of a fe,v homes
in a sparcely settled farming community prevent the
gro,vth of industry already well established along a
railroad.
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The very w·ording of the opinion requires further
clarification in the light of the various

t~ypes

of areas

which might be found appropriate for the establish1nent
of an industry:
"The fact that a region actually 1nay be industrial does not justify the creation with impunity of odors or stenches to an exoessive degree
\vhich unreasonably annoy others in the legitimate
use of their properties or in their occupation,
especially \vhen such conditions depreciate the
value of other properties in such area.'' (I talirs
ours.)
What is an excesstve

degree~

stenc.hes unreasonably annoy

''rhen do odors or

others~

Unless son1e stan-

dard is set, \Ve are subject to individual caprices and
opinion of the presiding judge, 111ore elastic than the
length of the chancellor's foot so often criticized.

No

standard is set in this case. No finding is made by either
court of any unreasonable operation by the defendant, or
even that its location is unreasonable.

The Dahl case has set a standard.

And we suh1nit

that when that standard is applied, it necessarily follo\vs
that the Colorado Animal plant is located and is operated
in an area to \vhich it is reasonably adapted.
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III.
The Court erred in assunring ,in, its opin£on that the
dtfend ant u·a ired a jury trial.
The defendant "·antrd n jury trial and contended
thnt it had a right to a jury trial for each of the separate
claiins of the eleYen individual plaintiffs against the
defendant.

It has long been recognized that the jury

system is especially adapted to a decision on specific and
silnple issues, and common la-\v pleading and procedure
are directed to,vard the framing of definite issues which
the jury or layn1en can grasp and decide. It is equally
recognized that a n1ultiplicity of issues coupled with a
rnultiplicity of parties is a burden far too heavy to place
on a jury of layn1en for its decision. The defendant, "\Ve
repeat, cle1nanded a separation of the causes of action
so that each of the sirnple issues could be tried before
r. jury on its own merits.

So long as the issues remained

conglomerate-so long as they involved the finding of
damage for eleven different plaintiffs residing in eleven
different directions from the plant at eleven distances
'vho 'vere being affected by \vinds blowing in different
directions at different ti1nes, some of whom had 'vorked
at the plant and contributed to the nuisance, while others
ha(l not, and so1ne of 'vho1n increased the value of their
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property after the plant had begun operation-as long as
all of these plaintiffs \Vere united in one action, of course,
the defendant could not properly demand a jury. Surely
it is unfair to the defendant to claim that it waived a
jury under such circu1nstances.
The opinion of the court, however, says that not only
did the defendant fail to demand a jury trial but the
minutes sho\v that on October 2, 1939, when plaintiffs
demanded a jury for deter1nination of the question of
dan1ages the defendant resisted such demand. The defendant opposed a jury at this time for the sa1ne reason
that it did not demand a jury trial. The lower court had
overruled both defendant's demurrer to the original
complaint and its demurrer to the supplen1ental conlplaint on the grounds of misjoinder of causes of action
and misjoinder of parties. The defendant then was in
a position where if it did not resist its demand for jury
it "\vould have all the issues and all of the various situations of the plaintiffs jumbled together and placed before
a jur~ of laymen. We submit that to resist such a demand is in no way equivalent to resisting or \vaiving a
jury to try separately each of the twelve different issues
in this case.
This incident of the demand for jury trial is a silnple
illustration of the fallacy of the claim that when there is
such a joinder of parties and issues the legal rights of
the defendants are retained.
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In it~ op1n1on herein this (iourt said: "If the defendant had not \YaiYed a jury trial, it \Vould have been
proper to have had damages determined by a jury,''
citing Wasatch Oil Refining Co. r. Wade, 92 Utah 50,
63 P. (2nd) 1070. But Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade
held:
"\\~here,

however, the case is one of equity
jurisdiction and the question of damages is before
the court, to be granted if proved, either in substitution for or in addition to equitable relief, the
denial of a jury trial is not the denial of any legal
right.''
Does this mean, then, that the Kinsman case is to be
1nodified to the extent that one party demanding a jury
in an equity case involving a multiplicity of parties and
issues may have that jury as a matter of right, and that
the other party will be subjected to a verdict of laymen
on this diversity of issues, \vithout right of protest~ Or
does it mean, on the other hand, that there is no right to
a jury at all, and all these issues must be found by the
trial judge, sitting as an equity court~ Mr. Justice
Frick, concurring in the Kinsman case (Kinsman v. Ut~ah
Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 Pac. 418), said that the
joined parties would have a right to separate appeals:
''In actions where the rights of the parties
are separate, but where they join in one action
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, or for some other
good reason, each one may prosecute an appeal
independently.''
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Is not this the

tin1(~

to clarify the 'vhole confusion

raised by the varied interpretations of the J(insJnan

cast~

and state the la"r to be what it should be, to-\vit, that
'vhen there is a legal question of damages involved, the
defendant should have a right to a separation of the
parties and issues for the henefit of a jury trial"?

CONCT_JUSION
For these three principal reasons, therefore,
quest a rehearing of this case.

"~e

Other n1a tters, such

rea~

the manner of justifying the lower court's excessive conlputation of damage, could be urged. We feel, ho,vever,
that the matter of this Court's approving a 1neasure of
damages that can be applicable only in the event of a
permanent damage, is so serious that it alone
a rehearing of

thi~

'varrant~

matter, and includes the errors of

computation.
The second ground of the petition is the fart that
the Court overlooked entirely the basis of the Dahl
case-that the use of the plant n1ust be unreasonable in
its location to be a nuisance. This, we submit,

warrant~

a rehearing.
The third basis is the accusation of the Court that
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the defendant 'Yaived a jury trial. In fact, in view of the
lower court's refusal to separate the causes of action, and
of this Court's statement to the law of joinder, the defendant never had the privilege or the right to waive a
jury trial of a straight-forward issue between it and any
one of its plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
~IOYLE

RICHARDS & McKAY,

Attorneys for

D~efendJant

and Appellant.
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